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Unlocking Housing Equity in Japan
Olivia S. Mitchell and John Piggott
Abstract

Much prior literature on asset patterns among the elderly has mostly overlooked housing
wealth as a determinant of retiree wealth, particularly in the Japanese context. Yet releasing
equity in housing may be a natural mechanism to boost consumption, reduce public pension
liability, and mitigate the demand for long-term care facilities in Japan. Our study evaluates
what might be needed to implement reverse mortgages (RMs) in this country. Policies could
include exempting RMs from capital gains tax and transactions tax, along with mechanisms to
make annuity income flows nontaxable, along with interest rate accruals for RMs. In addition,
housing market reforms to enhance information flows would be needed, particularly regarding
new and existing housing trades, which could permit the securitization of housing loans and lines
of credit. Other improvements in capital markets could also help, including the establishment of
reinsurance mechanisms to help lenders offer these reverse mortgages while having some
protection against crossover risk. In the Japanese case, demand for RMs will be dampened by
declining residential housing values as well as low interest rates and long life expectancies.
Nevertheless, we conclude that RMs can be a good way to finance elderly consumption in Japan,
particularly against the backdrop of governmental financial stringencies.

Unlocking Housing Equity in Japan
Olivia S. Mitchell and John Piggott

I. Introduction and Rationale for Reverse Mortgages
This study explores the feasibility of developing the reverse mortgage (RM) market in
Japan. Though RMs are not yet widely understood, we conclude that they have the potential to
significantly ease the fiscal burden which rapid demographic aging is imposing on traditional
state-funded retirement provision in Japan. Nevertheless these products will be appealing only
when the regulatory infrastructure within which they operate is appropriately developed.
1. Motivation for the Study
Dependency ratios1 in Western countries, already high, will rise dramatically in the next
30 years. The OECD average dependency ratio in 2000 was 20.9 per cent, and it will increase to
37 per cent by 2030. Indeed, for Italy, France, Germany, and Japan, the demographic situation is
especially painful, since their dependency ratios are projected to exceed 45 per cent within less
than 30 years (Disney and Johnson 2001: 12). Population aging inevitably puts considerable
strain on the public purse, since in most nations, the elderly are heavily dependent on a wide
range of publicly-provided income and benefit programs. Moreover, labor market behavior has
also changed over time: increasingly, people in most developed nations are electing to retire
earlier. A recent survey confirms that in the last 30 years, market participation rates for men age
60-64 fell from 70-90 percent, down to 20-50 percent (Bateman et al., 2001: 28; Japan is a
notable exception, with male participation rates remaining at about 80 percent, though far fewer
women work for pay at older ages.) Both factors tend to reduce the tax base and drain public
revenue, precisely in uncertain macroeconomic times.
It is not just changing demography and social behaviour that augur badly for current
pension arrangements. During the 20th century, many state public retirement systems because
very generous, with western countries offering earnings-related publicly funded pensions where
replacement rates often came to exceed 70 per cent (Disney and Johnson, 2001: 4). Of course,
there is a considerable diversity of systems among the OECD countries; the UK and Australia,
for example, provide more austere public retirement programs in which the government offers
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only a basic retirement allowance and any additional retirement income must be supplemented
by private sector arrangements (Bateman et al., 2001).
In some western countries, these factors are generating burgeoning public cost
projections that compel drastic restructuring of the national pension system. In France, Germany,
Italy, and Japan, projected pension spending will exceed 15 per cent of GDP annually by 2040
(Disney and Johnson 2001: 13). Since government budgets even in the big-spending continental
countries amount to no more than 40 or 50 percent of GDP, this will become an enormous
burden, probably not a sustainable one.
It is this set of concerns that provides the impetus for the present study of new financial
arrangements for financing old-age consumption in Japan. We will show, first, that Japan offers
an environment conducive to the implementation and encouragement of RMs. Second, we will
illustrate how their use could alleviate some of the financial strain that population aging imposes
on the Japanese economy of the future.
2. What are Reverse Mortgages?
Reverse Mortgages (RMs) allow the elderly to borrow money against the value of their
owned homes, so as to enhance their current consumption. No repayments of interest or principal
must be made until the homeowner dies or vacates his home,2 at which point the residence must
be sold and the proceeds used to repay the loan. The borrower is guaranteed tenure in his house
until death, and he also receives additional income in his retirement. The RM loan is defined by
being “non-recourse” – that is, no other asset may be accessed by the lender to reclaim his loan.
The lender therefore faces the risk that he will not recover the full value of his loan for a host of
reasons to be discussed below. As a consequence, the lender will set the maximum amount that
borrowers can receive, and he will also design alternative methods of paying the borrower this
amount, including in the form of a life annuity or a lump sum.
Several features of RMs appeal in the context of retirement provisioning. The delayed
repayment schedule, the tenure guarantee, and the non-recourse nature of the loan, are potentially
quite attractive to the older homeowner. Yet these instruments are not magic, from the lender’s
or the borrower’s perspective: there is a cost and a benefit for the RM collateralized by the equity
in the home. For several reasons, due to the rising debt balance through time, accumulating
drawdowns, and the ongoing accrual of interest, RMs can be expensive. Consequently, some
retirees’ estates will be significantly diminished when owners borrow against their home equity
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during their lives. For lenders, there is a risk that the value of the loan will come to exceed the
value of the property at the time of sale. Because lenders have no recourse to assets other than
the mortgaged house, low home equity could entail a loss for the lender. Consequently, lenders
determine a maximum proportion of equity that can be borrowed based upon the life expectancy
of the individual, the likely trajectory of property prices, and the anticipated rates of interest.
These are the three main risk factors for the lender; additional discussion on these and RMs in
general are given below, in Part III.
RMs are a relatively new financial product. It appears that they have been promoted and
used the most in the United States over the past decade. Several research studies have examined
the potential for growth in the US market for RMs, though estimates vary considerably. For
instance, Merrill et al. (1994) estimate a potential US market of 800,000 households, while
Rasmussen et al. (1997) predict a potential US market of 6.7 million households. Whatever the
estimates of market potential, the actual take-up of RMs proved initially slow in the US: since
1989, when the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program was launched, only
80,000 such mortgages have been originated. Yet one must note that HECM was intended to be a
demonstration program offered by the government for only a limited time. For this reason, the
loan value of these RMs was capped to target them on low-income elderly. More generally, there
is reason to believe that these products will become more appealing in the near future. For
example, in the fiscal year ended September 2002, more than 13,000 RMs were originated in the
US, a 68 percent increase over the 2001 figure. Low interest rates and relatively high property
prices reinforced the attractiveness of RMs, leading the number of active reverse mortgage
lenders in the United States to triple to 191, in the year preceding May 2002.3 All this suggests
that experts agree that RMs should grow rapidly in the US context, as more people become
aware of the product (Caplin, 2002). Further, lenders should become better at marketing the
product over time, enhancing supply. The modest and growing success of RMs in the US thus
implies that there is reason to expect some success in Japan, as well.
3. Key Issues for Japanese Reverse Mortgages
Japan’s aging rate is uniquely high among the developed countries. The explanation rests
on Japan having experienced a shorter period of high fertility following World War II than other
OECD economies. Births per family fell from 4.5 per family in 1947, to 2.7 in 1953, and to just 2
in 1957.4 Australia, by contrast, had a fertility rate greater than 3 for all years between 1947 and
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1961.5 In Japan, the result has been a rapidly increasing dependency ratio, which in 2030 is
predicted to be more than double the 1990 ratio of 21.6 per cent. Some initial social security
reforms have recently been enacted in Japan, and others proposed, including raising the
eligibility age for the standard pension; nevertheless, projections suggest that these are not yet
substantial enough to mitigate the expected cost explosion in public pensions as a result of
demographic aging (Disney and Johnson, 2001: 16).
The high value of residential real estate is another notable Japanese characteristic. An
Economist survey recently showed that Tokyo and Osaka’s residential property prices are the
second most expensive of all western cities: an average 2-bedroom city apartment in 2002 cost
over US$800,000.6 More important, these real estate prices are high relative to Japanese average
disposable incomes: housing wealth as a proportion of annual disposable income in 1998 was
381 per cent in Japan, the highest of all developed countries. The second highest, in Australia,
was 355 per cent, and the US rate was a much smaller 163 per cent (Ellis and Andrews, 2001).
Taken together, these facts indicate that the ability to use housing equity to supplement
retirement income might be both timely, offering a partial solution to mounting public pension
liabilities, and highly practicable. RMs can facilitate this process.
Yet establishing a RM tradition in Japan will not be easy. Simply making the Japanese
people aware of RMs will not produce a viable market, because a strong financial infrastructure
is required to ensure the success of these products. In short, there must be safeguards for
borrowers against unscrupulous lenders; there must be insurance available for lenders, who
otherwise might not involve themselves with what are inherently risky contracts; and there must
be a secondary market for reverse mortgages so that lenders have the option of selling some
proportion of their RMs to other parties and thus avoid the high risk charges that accompany
mortgages in general.7 A thorough understanding of the riskiness of RMs and the appropriate
level and cost of their insurance in the Japanese context is necessary to facilitate a Japanese RM
market.
Furthermore, Japan is a country in the midst of a very long recession, falling property
prices, and extremely low interest rates. Each of these facts will impinge upon the likely success
of RMs. The latter two circumstances in particular will reduce the amount of money that
households can borrow in relation to their property’s value, while the first will promote a lack of
confidence generally and diminish the appeal of little-known financial products. Nevertheless,
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RMs, properly implemented, do offer Japan a sound mechanism by which it can increase the
consumption of its elderly and in the long term even reduce its public pension liabilities and
health care costs. These considerations underscore the practical importance of this study.
The remainder of this paper deals with the above issues in more detail, and where
appropriate compares the Japanese situation to those of other developed countries.
II. Housing Wealth Among the Elderly
A necessary precondition for the use of RMs is the existence of private housing equity.8
In developed countries, enormous wealth is held in residential property. Viewed from the
perspective of strategic asset allocation, an owner-occupied dwelling is illiquid and
undiversified. Indeed, elderly people on average possess greater housing wealth than the
population average, but they can also have incomes that are much lower than those received by
younger groups.
4. Wealth in Housing
We next turn to an examination of the characteristics of housing wealth and ownership
among the elderly in three countries: the United States, Japan, and Australia. It should not be
surprising to find that, in all three countries, home equity represents the largest component of
household assets. In Japan, for instance, 51 percent of total assets were non-financial in 1996,
and of these home equity was by far the largest component (Ellis and Andrews, 2001: 5). In
Australia, housing assets amounted to 50 percent of all household assets according to a
government 1996 survey.9 In the United States, housing equity comprised 44 per cent of all
household wealth, much higher than the second largest component, interest-bearing securities,
according to a Census Bureau survey in 1995.10 We caution that these figures are not precisely
comparable, since each deals with slightly different accounting measures. Yet the implication is
clear: residents in each country hold a substantial amount of wealth in residential property.
Moreover, these heavy weightings in property might indicate that households seeking to increase
current consumption by reducing assets, would, in line with modern portfolio theory, look to
home equity first.
In all three countries, the amount of housing equity generally increases with age. Japan
exhibits this trend in the most consistent fashion. Figure 1 reports average net and gross dwelling
values for Japanese households of varying ages in 1999. The positive association of home equity
with age is clear: the most senior households in Japan have the greatest housing equity, with at
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least 35 million yen. Australia, too, offers a similar picture, but unlike Japan, the oldest cohort
does not have the greatest amount of housing equity. Among people age 65+, mean home equity
was $A155,000 in 1995/96, 8 percent higher than the average for all owner-occupiers.11 Figure 2
illustrates the United States data, which demonstrate the same general pattern as Australia:
housing equity rises for younger people, but then it begins to decline after the age of 64. Yet the
elderly still have substantial median housing equity, in 1995 being worth at least one third more
than the median housing equity ($US 50,000).12 These figures demonstrate that, on average,
elderly people hold more housing equity than do their younger contemporaries. Moreover, the
value of this equity is significant, and it could easily be used to supplement retirement income.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 here
In the case of Japan at least, Figure 1 shows that income and assets are not positively
correlated; indeed, average income falls with age after age 50-59. This might indicate that elderly
Japanese households would be desirous of some mechanism that would enable them to maintain
their income at a reasonably sustained level. This substantial home equity could be the means by
which they facilitate this end.
Figure 3 compares the housing wealth of all households and of the elderly in thousands
of $US across the three countries. Data have been adjusted to reflect year 2000 prices and have
been converted using Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates. The gross and net values for the
elderly in each country do not vary much, indicating that these households have relatively little
housing debt. The salient feature of this graph is the huge discrepancy between the high values of
Japanese properties on the one hand, and the lower Australian and US properties on the other.
Evidently, elderly Japanese have housing equity almost 50 per cent greater than their foreign
counterparts.
Figure 3 here
One reason this is so is that living patterns in Japan differ from those in western
countries, there being a strong tendency for many elderly in Japan to live with their children.
Consequently this pattern might be biased toward rich elderly Japanese households.13 As Figure
3 indicates, however, the value of houses held by other age groups in Japan, though less than that
of the elderly, is also vastly higher than Australian and US values for elderly people. Further,
Japanese living arrangements are rapidly approaching those in western countries. In 1998, some
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45 percent of elderly Japanese lived apart from their children, compared to only 27 percent in
1980 (Ishikawa and Yajima, 2001).
All these facts augur well for RMs in Japan, since they demonstrate that elderly
households have substantial housing equity, as a proportion of total assets, absolutely, and in
comparison to other age groups. Moreover, in light of these statistics, Japan seems to offer a
potentially even more favourable environment for such products than do Australia and the
United States.
5. Owner-Occupation Rates
A second essential pre-condition of a successful RMs market is that people must own
their homes. Renters lack home equity to convert to current consumption, and thus they cannot
avail themselves of the benefits of RMs. The data show, however, that aggregate owneroccupancy rates are quite high in all three countries of special interest here. Figure 4 compares
the owner-occupancy rates for the three countries by age group, and it confirms that the clear
trend is for owner-occupancy rates, like home equity, to increase with age. Indeed, rates hover
around 80 per cent for owner-occupiers age 65+, implying that a very high proportion of the
elderly occupies and owns the same home. Such high rates, combined with the high housing
equity examined above, underscore the substantial potential for RMs in Japan.
Figure 4 here
6. How Risky is Housing Wealth?
The tendency for households to retain much of their wealth in the form of housing equity
is discussed above, and it has been well documented in the western nations.14 This pattern no
doubt flows from both social tradition and tax policy favoring housing, yet it may not be such a
good idea from an economic perspective, given the price volatility of real estate.15 Figures 5 and
6 show the price movements of real estate in five major international cities and four major
countries, respectively.
The graphs clearly indicate that real estate can be quite volatile over the medium and
long term. Price increases and decreases of over 40 per cent within five years are not rare; Tokyo
prices, in particular, exhibit erratic price behavior. Consequently, there is concern that elderly
households could be concentrating too much of their wealth in a home, subjecting themselves to
a single volatile investment in real estate.
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Unfortunately, there is relatively little economic research that evaluates housing price
volatility into models of life cycle asset allocation, despite the obvious importance of owneroccupier housing in the portfolios of most retirees. For instance, Poterba (2001) points out that
in the US, real property accounted for about 1/3 of total financial assets in 2000, or about US$13
trillion. Flavin and Yamashita (2002) also confirm that few studies of household asset choice
incorporate housing as an asset. They then propose that substantial transactions costs for housing
purchase and sale mean that portfolio adjustment occurs on margins other than housing. Their
analysis finds that the return to housing in the US is uncorrelated with stocks, Treasury bills, and
bonds. Because young households are often highly leveraged with a housing mortgage, one
response is to hold bonds when young, and increase the weighting on stocks when households
grow older. This view is supported by Cocco (2000), who also argues that the life cycle pattern
of home ownership can explain why the proportion of wealth held in stocks tends to increase
with age.
Even if households wished to reduce some of their exposure to real estate, high
transaction costs and a lack of appropriate financial products might prevent them from doing so.
As Caplin (1999) argues, method to unlock home equity could therefore be a very valuable risk
management tool and also a mechanism to meet consumption needs for elderly households.
Figure 5 and Figure 6 here
7. Do the Elderly Decumulate their Housing Wealth?
A RM type product will only succeed if homeowners are prepared to draw down their
housing wealth in retirement. There is substantial debate about whether and to what extent this
occurs, and the empirical evidence is mixed. US research by Venti and Wise (2001) shows that a
decline in housing equity only takes place at the age of 75 and then at a rate of 1.76 per cent per
annum. Moreover, if households receiving adverse financial shocks are excluded, the decline is a
mere 0.11 per cent per annum. The authors conclude that the American elderly do not liquidate
their homes to support their general consumption needs as they age. Sheiner and Weil (1993)
however come to a different conclusion, finding instead a decline in home equity at older ages,
mainly associated with shocks to family status and health, or the death of a spouse. Figure 7
shows the decline in both owner-occupancy rates and dwelling values in the years leading up to,
and after, the death of a spouse.

9
Figure 7 here
Such information demonstrates that housing equity at older ages does decline. Figure 8
further illustrates this phenomenon by examining cohorts of elderly at different ages and at fiveyear intervals. Each cohort exhibits a decline in its ownership rate as it ages; again, however,
notable declines mainly take place at considerably advanced ages, especially after age 80. Thus
reductions in home equity in America are primarily incited by adverse unforseen shocks, and
even then these are most seen among the ‘old’ elderly.
Figure 8 here
Such findings must be interpreted with some caution, especially if seen as a possible
indicator of the likely behaviour of future cohorts. First, depreciation of the housing stock could
be occurring unrevealed by the data. Second, low drawdown may be associated with a lack of
means of secure drawdown – home equity loans leave the owner vulnerable to foreclosure.
Third, RM contracts are now proliferating in the US. Hence the currently working generation, in
all three exemplar countries, has fewer children and so may reduce the target value of intended
bequests to reflect this.
The pattern of housing value drawdown by age in Japan is investigated by Ishikawa and
Yajima (2001). These authors note that the Japanese elderly do exhibit negative saving after the
age of 65, but it appears to happen via the liquidation of financial assets, not housing assets. This
finding can be seen as consistent with the analysis of Flavin and Yamashita (2002) cited above.
The authors posit that elderly Japanese households on average leave an estate equivalent to 25.8
years of consumption. The untouched value of the home equity accounts for 20.5 years, and the
remainder is accounted for by unused financial assets (bank deposits, securities etc). By contrast,
they estimate that the elderly in the United States leave behind only 5 years of consumption.
Of course, this huge disparity might not reflect different intentions or preferences, but
rather a poorly performing Japanese housing market and financial sector that do not provide
secure means of housing wealth drawdown. This point is expanded upon later in this study, but
for now, we note the low level of market activity in the Japanese housing market. Figure 9 shows
that this market is only one tenth as active as the American market, and it focuses on the
construction of new dwellings rather than the purchase of existing ones. Furthermore, the
Japanese elderly only move one quarter as frequently as their American counterparts, which
could be the result of the emaciated housing market.
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Figure 9 here
Current related research suggests that in Australia and Japan, at least, households have
mostly paid off their mortgages at retirement. This behaviour is consistent with a reluctance to
draw down housing wealth in retirement. In the US, however, retirees have more housing debt. A
possible explanation for this lies in tax provisions. Interest on housing debt in the US is taxdeductible, whereas this is not the case in Australia or Japan. In turn, this points to the
importance of clear regulations and rules concerning concomitant liability with RMs, if such an
initiative is to succeed. It would be of interest to further investigate whether, and to what extent,
Japanese households draw down their housing wealth. Nishimura et al (1999) argue that housing,
and particularly land, operates as a tax shelter under Japan’s tax structure.
Various attempts have been made to explain why housing wealth is not drawn down
sooner and more fully by the elderly. Two frequently proffered reasons are the desire to leave
bequests, and precautionary saving. A bequest motive presumes that the elderly wish to leave
some or all of their estate as a gift for their heirs. Again, there is conflicting evidence
surrounding this issue. Hurd (2001) constructs a model for bequests and tests it using US data; he
finds that when one’s mortality risk becomes sufficiently high, housing decumulation does
indeed commence. Furthermore he reports that the extent of decumulation is invariant across
households with different numbers of children. Similar results have been reproduced by Haider
et al. (2001), who find that in the 1970s and 1980s, households with and without children
dissaved at the same rate. Moreover, a Japanese survey of the elderly in 2000 showed that
leaving an inheritance was most important for only 6 per cent of respondents (Ishikawa and
Yajima, 2001). Further little hard evidence supports the importance of bequest motives for the
average worker or retiree, in fact. Of the people who applied for a RM in the US, over 75 percent
reported having no children (Caplin, 2002). At least in relation to RMs, then, it seems that people
ostensibly less inclined to leave a bequest have been more frequent customers. The low Japanese
fertility rate thus suggests that the development of a viable RM market in Japan may be more
rather than less feasible.
Precautionary saving is another reason the elderly might wish to retain equity in their
home. Older people may keep substantial equity in case unplanned expenditures arise, such as
those associated with severe health problems. As yet, very little is known about how these events
actually affect dissaving patterns (Haider et al., 2001). In any event, it seems unlikely that
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households would want to retain the entire value of their property for precautionary savings,
especially as people knowingly come closer to their life expectancy.
It may be also be true that these reasons affect consumption only at the margin. Thus
elderly people might want to use their housing equity more frequently, but their desire to remain
in their homes might be a strongly dominant consideration, barring a health shock or marital
status change. Indeed, Venti and Wise (2000) reported that 95 percent of Americans age 75+
expressed a desire to remain in their current home for as long as possible. Transaction costs
aside, such sentiments are inimical to the suggestion that a household simply move to a smaller
residence in order to liquidate some of its housing equity. Given a pent-up desire to reduce home
equity but remain in the family home, the utility of a RM becomes apparent.
We have seen that households generally do not decumulate their housing equity with age
to the extent consistent with the simple life-cycle hypothesis. The desire to leave a bequest and
for precautionary savings are logical explanations for this contradiction, but it seems unlikely
that they can fully explain the enormous amount of housing equity that elderly households leave
upon their death. In theory at least, the RM seems to be an excellent financial instrument for that
proportion of elderly households who both wish to use some of their home equity to better enjoy
their life but who also wishes to remain in the home. Finally, it is worth remembering that all
these empirical results and research are endogenous to the currently prevailing pension systems.
Were state sponsored pensions to become substantially less generous, retirees might boost their
reliance on home equity to finance old age consumption.
III. How to Unlock Home Equity
As noted earlier, a reverse mortgage is a home loan to a homeowner, which the borrower
need not repay as long as he remains resident in his home. It is only at the time the house is sold,
or the owner moves permanently, that the loan plus interest must be repaid. One appeal of this
contract is that it provides homeowners, many of whom may be elderly, with a means to gain
access to their home equity without giving up title to the house and without being forced to move
out of their home.16 There are several different formats such contracts can take.
8. Varieties and Structures of Reverse Mortgages
A range of different products may be grouped under the reverse mortgage heading, but
what all have in common is that “the lender pays the borrower rather than vice versa”
(NRMLA:1). In other words, the lender promises to pay the homeowner a sum of money which
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the borrower can then convert into current consumption. In exchange, the lending institution
accumulates interest on this loan and earns a stake in the homeowner’s equity. The home loan is
repaid only when the borrower leaves the house due to death, permanent move, or sale.
The size of the reverse mortgage, or loan, available to the homeowner is a function of the
property’s initial value and projected future appreciation, the owner’s initial home equity,
interest rates, and the owner’s age and that of his/her spouse. In the US, income and credit
records are not used to determine the loan value, and the borrower’s medical condition cannot be
used to underwrite the terms of the loan.
A fundamentally important aspect of the reverse mortgage is that it is a “non-recourse”
loan. This means that the total value of the loan cannot exceed the sale value of the home. In
other words, even if the principal plus interest borrowed by a homeowner were to exceed the
property’s value, the lender’s repayment would always be capped at the value of the home. This
is important since reverse mortgages tend to grow over time, consistent with elderly
homeowners’ desire to draw down their home equity. The fact that the loan is capped, even as
payments to the homeowner continue, imposes on the lender the risk that the debt on the house
might exceed the home value. In order to protect against that eventuality, lenders tend to limit the
size of the loan provided, and also to require an insurance premium to help protect against that
risk.
Other key aspects of reverse mortgages are that payment is due to the lender when the
borrower moves out of the home, sells it, or dies; in addition, the lender can also require
repayment of the reverse mortgage in the event that the borrower fails to pay property taxes, fails
to keep up the home, or fails to purchase hazard insurance. Also the loan may come due if the
homeowner were to rent the home, change the property’s zoning classification, take out new debt
against the home, or add a new owner (AARP, 2001:19).
A Taxonomy of Reverse Mortgage Types
RMs may be classified according to the types of institutions that offer them. In the US
context, the three most important types include the following:17
 Single purpose RMs, also known as Deferred Payment Loans (DPLs), tend to pay out
a single lump sum used to help pay property taxes, cover home repair bills, or allow enhanced
building accessibility for elderly residents (Hersh, 2001). These tend to be offered by state and
local government groups to lower-income individuals; some are limited to the disabled or
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elderly. They generally have no or low up-front costs (e.g. no origination fee or closing costs),
and a portion of the loan may be forgiven if the homeowner remains in the home a specified
period of time after closing. Often the programs are subsidized through property taxes or general
revenue. A homeowner may repay the DPL with interest at any time, and the balance must be
repaid at the time of the sale of the house or the borrower’s death.
 Lender-insured proprietary RMs are offered by private-sector firms, banks, and
mortgage companies on more expensive homes, which provide age 62+ homeowners of any
income level home loans that may be used for any purpose. These loans are not backed by
government reinsurers, so lenders charge a risk premium to protect against the possibility that the
loan balance exceeds the home value. To date, relatively few sellers operate sell these RMs in
only a few states; one of the best known cases is the California-based Financial Freedom Senior
Funding Corporation, backed by Lehman Brothers. Proprietary RMs tend to be more costly than
federally-insured HECMs (see below) and other government-backed home loans.
 Home Equity Conversion Mortgages (HECMs) are US federally-insured loans
available to homeowners age 62+ for any purpose. They can be sold by banks and mortgage
companies without regard to the homeowner’s income level. The maximum loan amount, called
the “203-b limit”, is set by law and rises annually; in 2001, it was about $132,000 for non-urban
areas and $240,000 in urban areas. The loan may be taken in the form of a single lump sum, a
line of credit (available on demand), or a monthly cash advance (payable as a fixed nominal
value for either a specified term or as a life annuity); combinations of these are also available.
HECM lenders are protected against the risk that the loan plus interest will exceed the home’s
value by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). This form of RM imposes substantial upfront costs, including an origination fee totalling up to 2% of the home value (or the 203-b limit);
closing costs that cover fees for title search and title insurance, legal and appraisal services,
surveys and inspections, mortgage taxes, credit checks, and other related services; and a HECM
insurance premium, equal to 2% of the home value (or the 203-b limit). In addition, HECM
originators charge a servicing fee which is a monthly charge limited to $30-35/mo, and
additional insurance costs totalling 0.5% of the rising loan balance on top of the monthly interest
rate. Most lenders charge a variable interest rate which adjusts annually; in this event, the rate
may vary no more than the change in the 1-year Treasury bill rate, and it cannot change more
than 2 percentage points per year, with a cap of 5 percentage points over the life of the loan.18
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The HECM must be repaid at the time of the sale of the house or the borrower’s death; also the
lender can require repayment if the homeowner leaves the home, does not pay property taxes or
hard insurance, or fails to maintain the property.
HECM type RMs, more generically termed tenure RMs, offer both income until death
and repayment at time of death. This combination has proved the most attractive. Implicit in
these tenure RMs are four guarantees for the borrower, each of which must be borne by the
lender (Philips and Gwin, 1993). These include:
 Residency Guarantee: The homeowner can remain in the property until death,
regardless of the loan balance.
 Income Guarantee: Income support will continue for as long as the homeowner lives
in the home.
 Repayment Guarantee: There is no repayment obligation until the homeowner dies or
sells the home.
 Nonrecourse Guarantee: The homeowner’s other assets cannot be used to repay the
loan.
Payout alternatives
The manner in which borrowers choose to receive their RM loan payments can vary. In
the US, cash can be accessed as a lump sum, as a life annuity, as a line-of-credit, or as some
combination of these. The most popular method has been the line-of-credit option, which by
1999 had been chosen for more than two-thirds of the RMs issued (Syzmanoski and DiVenti,
2001). This is the most flexible option, as it allows borrowers to draw down money at their own
time, up to some maximum amount. Interest accrues only on money that has been drawn.
Nevertheless, the lump sum and annuity options lend themselves to a general exposition;
intuitively, the line-of-credit option lies in between these two schemes.19
Determining the Payout Values: Analytical considerations
At a general level, all reverse mortgage offerings that are self-financing must be priced so
that the lending institution can expect to make back the money loaned plus interest over the term
of the contract, after pooling risks across the set of loans sold. Here we provide an analysis of the
lump-sum and annuity options for the reverse annuity product.
A simplified model of the loan amount can be specified by supposing a single borrower
took out a loan in the form of a lump sum (LS) using his future home value as collateral. Then in
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a competitive market, the actuarially fair amount he could borrow would be set so the loan
balance would equal in present value the anticipated value of the house at the time of sale. This
may be defined as follows,

LS =

max Age − x +1

∑
t =1

t

 1+ r + g 
HEQ * 
 *t p x
1+ r + m 

1)

where:
r = expected future riskless rate of return;
g = additional risk premium expected on housing investment above the riskless rate;
m = additional risk premium expected on mortgage loans above the riskless rate;
HEQ = home equity amount at the time the loan is taken out;
t px

= probability of survival t periods from age x;

maxAge = oldest possible survival age from life table (e.g. 110).
The lump sum (LS) simply grows at the mortgage rate (r + m), and the total amount
repayable (Q) after t periods is:
Q = LS (1 + r + m ) t

2)

The mathematics for a life annuity are more complicated. Again, the lender
determines the actuarially fair maximum present value of an annuity (LS) that a borrower
can purchase. The borrower then receives a fixed nominal payment per period until death.
The nominal payment (PMT) is calculated thus:

PMT =
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ω
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1
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where r is the risk-free rate of interest, t is the number of payment periods until death, and t p x is
the annuitant’s probability of survival t periods from age x. These equations form the basic
structure of the RM products.
Determining the Payout Values: Practical Considerations

In a practical setting, a RM lender would specify each of the model parameters, including
the initial home value, the pattern of expected future riskless returns, expected future risk premia
on the appreciation of the house and on mortgage loans, and the future mortality table that would
apply to the borrower as well as the maximum possible age of survival.
This simple model could also be made more realistic in a practical setting, in several
ways. First, the initial home value must be specified net of any remaining mortgage, if there is
one. Second, the lender often demands that the home be brought into good repair at the outset, to
protect the value of the lender’s investment. In practice, needed repairs may be not only included
in the value of the loan, but they also might be stipulated on an ongoing basis. Third, lenders
must develop a forecast of future returns in developing the loan amount that can be provided,
most importantly, for the riskless rate and the future mortgage rate. Since these are unknown,
some sensitivity analysis is usually required.
Fourth, the lender must devise a forecast of each home’s likely future appreciation, and
here there is a distinct possibility of adverse selection and/or moral hazard. For instance, a
homeowner who believed that his own home was deteriorating in value would be more likely to
seek a RM than average; furthermore, once a RM was obtained, the homeowner might be less
likely to keep up the property.20 Fifth, the lender must model not only the probability of home
sale due to the borrower’s death, but also the chance that the homeowner will terminate his
residency due to other reasons including the need to move into a nursing home and or to move in
with children. Data on actual termination rates are virtually impossible to obtain (Rodda et al.
2000), though early evidence in the US indicates that younger homeowners are terminating their
HECM loans more quickly than anticipated by the government insurers (Syzmanoski and
DiVenti, 2001).
A sixth consideration is that a lender must identify and/or develop the mortality table(s)
appropriate to RM users. The illustration above specifies the survival pattern of a single
individual, whereas in practice many elderly seeking RMs might be married couples. In that
instance, using a joint and survivor table would likely be more appropriate than a single female
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table. In addition, one must determine whether to use population or annuitant mortality tables,
since the former expresses the entire nation’s mortality experience, whereas the latter tends to
have lower-than-average mortality patterns due to the fact that annuitants tend to be self-selected
to live longer than average (McCarthy and Mitchell, 2002; forthcoming). A lender who uses a
population table would then potentially be exposed to the possibility that those people who seek
to borrow against their equity might actually have lighter-than-average mortality experience,
akin to the degree of adverse selection found among annuity buyers. Whether this is appropriate
is not yet known given relatively little experience with RMs, though RM buyers may be in worse
health and require the housing loan to pay medical bills (in which case they would likely die
earlier).21 It is also unlikely that a lender would use a period life table, instead of a cohort table,
since the former assumes fixed mortality rates over time whereas a cohort table builds in
anticipated improvements in life expectancy. The latter is a more conservative stance, which
would lead to a reduction in the amount that could be loaned on the house.
Computing Payout Values: An example

To compute either the appropriate annuity payments or the lump sum amount that can be
borrowed, a lender must develop assumptions regarding the evolution of interest rates, future
home values, and mortality tables, as well as termination probabilities. Compared to the lump
sum approach mentioned above, both the line-of-credit and the annuity payout approach would
postpone the time path of funds borrowed. In this event, the lender might either charge a lower
mortgage rate for the delayed payout arrangement, or permit the borrower to obtain a larger
fraction of his initial home equity, than under the lump sum approach.
The data in Figure 10, below, illustrate a range of results for the US context. The results
are computed using a website calculator provided by the AARP, a prominent and nationallyknown senior citizen organization. The data assume the 1-year Treasury bill rates in effect at the
time of computation and national average closing costs for RMs. Two sets of results are
provided, those that would be available under the HECM program which are insured by the
Federal Housing Administration, and those available via a proprietary RM program developed
by Fannie Mae, known as the HomeKeeper Mortgage. 22
Figure 10
These data indicate that a 75-year old with $100,000 in net home equity could obtain a
federally-insured HECM lump-sum home equity loan of about $62,000, versus a HomeKeeper
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loan of about or 44% less or $34,800. Alternatively, the borrower could take the loan as a
monthly payment as long as he remained in his home. For the 75-year old with $100,000 in net
equity, this would amount to around $402 per month, or $4,800 per year, in the Homekeeper
case; this annuity is 25% above the annual $3,600 generated by the HECM product. It is
interesting that tripling the available home equity to $300,000 raises the lump sum obtainable by
three times in the HECM case, but more than triples the lump sum payable by the HomeKeeper
product. In the annuity flows, the HECM annuity remains higher than the HomeKeeper payout,
but the disadvantage shrinks at higher levels of equity: thus the former annuity would total
$14,000 per year, versus $11,700 for the latter (only a 15% difference). This shrinking gap
probably reflects the fact that the HomeKeeper loan is intended to attract homeowners with more
valuable properties.
Other Techniques to Access Home Equity

In addition to RMs, various other financial arrangements have been suggested to help
older homeowners access the equity in their homes. Caplin et al. (1997) advocate housing
partnerships, where the homeowner becomes the “managing” partner and operates the
property jointly with an investor who is a limited partner. The latter has no personal liability
so the investment could potentially be securitized on the secondary market. Several new or
potential products are reviewed by Shiller and Weiss (1998). With home equity insurance,
the homeowner could purchase insurance on the price of his home at resale (a ‘put’),
enabling him to participate in some of the upside potential but gain protection against the
downside. To reduce the potential for moral hazard, they suggest that the insurance would
be linked to an area housing price index rather than one’s own house. Under a shared equity
or appreciation mortgage program, the homeowner would receive a low-interest loan from a
lender, with the repayment date linked to the date when the owner moves or sells. The
lender then shares in future appreciation of the home’s value but does not take on
depreciation. These have been sold by the Bank of Scotland, with an interest rate of zero and
the lender receives three-quarters of the home’s appreciation. Finally, under a sale of
remainder interest arrangement, the homeowner would sell all or a portion of his home to
investors; after the owner’s death, investors would receive the entire value of the house (this
has been sold in the state of California as the “Lifetime Security Plan.”)

19
9. RMs and Forward Mortgages23

It is instructive to consider the differences between a RM and a traditional, or forward,
mortgage. Traditional home purchase mortgages depend primarily upon the borrower’s ability
(income) and willingness (credit history) to repay the loan. The home equity (collateral) acts as
additional security for lender. For reverse mortgages however, full repayment depends only on
home equity being adequate; borrowers often have very low income and current credit problems
(which in many cases is why they need a reverse mortgage). Secondly, and consequently, the
borrower does not have to repay the principal or interest until the loan becomes due at the single
repayment date. Thus the loan balance is in fact increasing through time. Forward mortgages by
contrast generally exhibit decreasing loan balances through time, since the principal and interest
are continually being repaid.
The implications of the above differences between reverse and home purchase mortgages
are that reverse mortgages may be theoretically simpler to analyse from the perspective of
needing to examine credit and employment histories. Indeed, this is not necessary. However,
when one considers the need to predict economic conditions (property values) and terminations
(based on exogenous factors) many years into the future, the complexity of pricing RMs becomes
apparent. The difficulty in making such predictions is a reason why reverse mortgages have either
been very conservatively priced (which reduces their marketability) or else been more liberally
priced only with a government guarantee (more on this later).
10. Key Supply Risks

After having chosen to acquire a RM, the principal risk for the individual borrower is the
possibility of an eventually bankrupt lender. This may not be material in the event of a lump sum
loan. For the lender however, the risks surrounding the supply of RMs are far more complicated.
Figure 11 indicates the essential risk issues surrounding the supply of RMs. It shows a graphical
representation of the model described above.
Figure 11 here
In this setup, the house price, the lump sum, and the loan due to an annuity payout all
grow with time. Taken together, these curves represent “crossover risk,” or the risk that the
property might be worth less than the value of the loan at the time the loan becomes due. Such a
scenario is quite feasible, since the growth rate of the value of the property is presumably less
than that of the mortgage rate; and thus, given time, the loan will ‘catch up’ to the property.
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Although an apt graphical description, “crossover risk” is actually a generic term that veils the
more precise sources of risk. Philips and Gwin (1993) identify five specific categories of risk
confronting an RM lender. These are longevity risk, interest rate risk, general home appreciation
risk, specific home appreciation risk, and expense risk. We deal with these in turn:
•

Longevity Risk

This risk is the most easily explained. If borrowers remain in their homes for a long
period of time, there is a greater chance that the value of the loan will exceed the value of the
property. This phenomenon results from the loan’s having had relatively more time to catch up to
the more slowly growing property value. This risk will be exacerbated the greater is the difference
between the mortgage rate and the property growth rate. The saving grace of longevity risk is that
through diversification and pooling of risks the lender can considerably attenuate this risk.
Mortality tables tell us, and lenders are aware, that some people will die early and some people
will die late. The profits on the former should be able to subsidise the latter. Nevertheless, adverse
selection can make this relationship difficult if more healthy people are applying than sickly ones.
•

Interest Rate Risk

Interest rate risk is complicated. The degree of interest rate risk will depend on whether
the lender is dealing in fixed-rate or variable rate mortgages. In the case of fixed-rate RMs, the
lender is unable to control the change in its assets following an increase or decrease in market
interest rates. For example, an increase in market rates will decrease the value of its fixed-rate
RM assets, which will now be earning a lower comparative rate of return. Such an event would
reduce the profit margin of the lender. On the other hand, variable interest rate RMs will avoid the
latter problem, but will prevent the lender from knowing the future value of its assets with
certainty. Even small changes in interest rates can have large effects on the future loan value,
since the interest charges are capitalised as additions to a burgeoning loan balance rather than
paid as they accrue. Moreover, interest rate rises, by increasing more rapidly the borrower’s debt,
can increase the probability that a loan balance will exceed the value of a property at the time of
repayment.
Lenders typically incur liabilities in the form of bonds or other contracts and then reinvest
the proceeds in RMs. The process of matching asset income with debt-servicing requirements is
known as immunisation. Because of the unusual cash-flow pattern of RMs, it is often difficult to
maintain a completely immunised asset-liability dichotomy. A poorly immunized portfolio can
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further exacerbate the detrimental effects of interest rate changes, since liability-servicing
requirements will be out of step with income, and thus the time difference between receipt of
income and payment of debt will be host to a variable and unpredictable rate of interest.
Finally, Boehm and Ehrhardt (1994) show empirically that interest rate changes are far
riskier for RMs than for other types of interest-bearing assets. The intuition is that the small
balance sheet values of newly originated RMs belie the growing future assets that these new RMs
imply. Interest rate changes have little effect on these small initial balance sheet values, yet future
asset values can be changed enormously. In contrast, the effect of interest rate changes on forward
mortgages can be observed directly from the balance sheet.
•

General House Appreciation Risk

The future values and growth rates of property are unknown to lenders, yet lenders rely on
these values in order to make a profit. Consequently, general house appreciation risk is obvious.
Further, this risk is not wholly diversifiable as is longevity risk (for the most part). It is true that
having RMs attached to properties of a wide type and geographical location will reduce the risk of
declining property values due to a regional recession, but such a strategy cannot avoid a national
(or international) housing price decline. The expectation of housing price appreciation at the
commencement of loan will also determine how much the lender is willing to lend, and thus it is
not an issue only for lender. Thus borrowers, too, have a vested interest in the expected property
price appreciation at origination of a loan.
•

Specific House Appreciation Risk

Even if the general house appreciation takes place as the lender predicts, there is no
guarantee that the particular portfolio of homes on which it has sold RMs will appreciate at this
particular rate. Indeed, there will be a distribution of possible rates around the general
appreciation rate. The variance of this distribution will depend on the proportion of the market
that a particular lender services. It is virtually guaranteed that losses will result from the specific
house appreciation risk, since values on the higher side of the distribution do not generate any
extra profit for the lender who only receives (at most) the loan balance back at the time of the
house sale. Further, lower rates of home equity growth can definitely produce larger losses for
lenders.
•

Expense Risk
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Since the RM market is small in the United States and still incipient elsewhere, a
prospective lender would incur considerable expenses in marketing and soliciting sceptical
customers for a product the details of which are little known outside a specialist community.
Moreover there are legislative burdens to overcome, and much experimentation will be necessary
to determine what are the most effect methods of administration and selling. All this costs money:
hence there is a risk that the products will fail, and these costs might not be recouped. This is
termed expense risk.
11. Risks For the Borrower

Turning now to risks faced by the borrower, some concern has been expressed that older
homeowners might not understand that they are pledging their home equity when they take out a
RM, or they might not realize that the value of the loan is compounded over time as long as they
live in their house. For this reason, the HECM loan structure in the US requires that borrowers
receive educational counselling, and further that all fees be disclosed according to a strict
government-set format (Rodda et al., 2000). A related concern is that many elderly homeowners
who lived through the Great Depression are strongly averse toward taking on debt (Rodda et al.,
2000).
An additional consideration arises when a homeowner opts for an annuity payout stream
rather than a lump sum. This arises because of the chance that a borrower might die “too early,”
or before his life expectancy. Of course this possibility must be weighed against the security of
the borrower knowing that he could not outlive his asset, precisely due to the annuity structure.
Alternatively, a homeowner may convert his home equity into different segments, for instance,
partitioning the cash available into a life annuity as well as a lump sum. This approach not only
affords a mixture of upfront cash and longevity protection, but it also offers elderly homeowners
a means to preserve some equity to help pay for future medical bills, or even to provide a bequest
to their heirs after death. More recently, some insurers have begun to offer combination annuity
plan that offers healthy elders a life annuity, but it then pays an additional sum if the elder
becomes disabled (Warshawsky et al., 2001). This sort of product innovation could certainly be
transferred to the RM context, to the extent that people feel they wish to preserve some cash to
cover long-term care needs.
Yet a different risk facing homeowners taking a reverse mortgage is the possibility that
the lender might file for bankruptcy after the contract is in force. If the borrower had taken a
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lump sum loan, there would presumably be no additional risk, but if the borrower were expecting
a life annuity, the credit of the insurer would be key. In the special case of a federally insured
RM, borrowers would probably continue receiving annuity payments, but it is less clear what
would happen in the event of bankruptcy of a lender-insured privately-originated RM.24 It is
clearly critical to raise borrower awareness of the importance of purchasing annuities from
highly-rated private insurers, in protecting against this possibility.
There are several ways in which tax and transfer policy interfaces with RM practice, all
of which also expose the homeowner to risk when he takes out a reverse mortgage. One problem
arises if a homeowner moves and sells his home for more than he paid, this could produce a
taxable capital gain. But if he also held an RM, it is possible that what he owed on the RM loan
might exceed what was netted from the house sale (Caplin, 2002). In such a case, the homeowner
might be unable to pay the tax bill despite having made a gain on the house.25 Another as-yetunresolved question is how the tax authority (the Internal Revenue Service, in the US) views the
reverse mortgage contract. If it deems the RM transaction a sale of the house rather than a loan
against the home value, the income received by the household could be treated as taxable
ordinary income, which would clearly be disadvantageous. Furthermore, life annuities are
subject to higher marginal tax rates late in life (Brown et al., 2001), which makes it crucially
important for the older homeowner to pay close attention to the timing of the income flow
generated by the RM product.
Yet a different issue crops up for very low-income households who are eligible to receive
subsidies from government programs. In the US context, regular old age Social Security and
Medicare benefits are not offset by RM payments, and a loan advance from an RM would not be
counted against SSI/Medicaid benefits if the recipient spent the entire amount in a given month.
On the other hand, a RM loan paid out as an annuity does offset Supplemental Security Income
(SSI, for those with little income and virtually no assets) at a 100% tax rate, and eligibility for
Medicaid can also be cut. Furthermore, if a poor homeowner were to save any portion of a RM
loan, this too would threaten his receipt of welfare benefits. Evidently, the decision to take a RM
loan, and the form in which the loan is taken, may greatly influence a low-income homeowner’s
wellbeing, which makes the product seem additionally complex for poorer individuals.

24
12. The Need for RM Insurance

Because of the aforementioned risks, lenders are unlikely to offer RMs unless they can
purchase some insurance to pool these risks. In the US context, mortgage insurance has been
needed to protect against the circumstance where the value of the loan may come to exceed the
value of the collateral. The concern is on the part of risk-averse lenders worrying they might not
be repaid all of the principal advanced and interest accrued when the loan becomes due and
payable. We also note that it is not only the lender that would be partial to some insurance; the
borrower might like protection against a bankrupt lender if he had adopted the annuity payout
structure.
The US experience offers an example of a government-sponsored system of insurance that
provides such guarantees for both parties. The Home Equity Conversion Mortgage Program
(HECM) was instituted by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in 1989 to
1) allow the conversion of home equity into liquid assets to meet the needs of elderly home
owners; 2) determine the extent of market demand for RMs; and 3), to encourage would-be
lenders to participate in the RM market. In order to encourage 1) and facilitate 3), the program
had to include some form of insurance. The HECM program stipulates that borrowers are to pay a
mortgage insurance premium to insure both themselves and lenders. The insurance premium
consists of two parts, both of which may be financed (Case and Schnare, 1994). First, there is an
immediate premium of 2 per cent of the property value paid at loan origination. Second, there is a
consequent annual premium of 0.5 per cent of the loan’s outstanding balance, which accrues to
the outstanding balance on a monthly basis. If the borrower chooses to finance his premium then
the maximum amount of credit to which he is entitled is reduced accordingly. For the borrower,
the insurance premium allows the HECM program to guarantee three borrower-protections
(Szymanoski and DiVenti, 2001):
•

The loan can never become due as long as the borrower remains in the home.

•

Should the lender fail to make repayments, HUD will step in and forward the payments
instead.

•

Lender-independent counselling must be provided prior to a borrower’s assenting to the
terms of a RM.
For the lender, this premium ensures that if a loan grows to equal 98 per cent of the

property’s value, the lender can assign the loan to HUD, after which the lender would file an
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insurance claim with HUD and obtain an amount equal to the mortgage balance at the time of
assignment. Henceforth the lender would have no obligation to service that particular RM.
13. Administration Costs and Regulation

Some writers have attributed the lacklustre performance of the US RM market to high
administrative costs and regulatory confusion. Apart from insurance-related matters, these are the
other practical issues that need to be adequately addressed for a viable RM market. The problem
of high administration costs has been noted by Caplin (2002). He notes that the average total of
transaction costs per HECM loan originated, excluding insurance premium, has amounted to more
than $4,500, or about 10 percent of the total loan (compared to the median principal limit that
people are able to borrow – around $47,000). These costs mainly pertain to fees charged to
borrowers by lenders, which can relate to appraisal costs, title search and recording costs, credit
checks, and loan processing costs (Case and Schnare, 1994). These high costs are partly due to
the relative newness of the RM product, and the presently small size of the market; and these
factors should diminish with time. Nevertheless, they remain an impediment to the growth of the
market.
In the US, RMs have been somewhat of a regulatory nightmare, as they sit “at the
intersection of many different, confusing, incomplete regulatory systems” (Caplin, 2001: 17). Due
to restrictive financial laws, even the sale of RMs in certain US states has been problematic.26
More relevant now is the legal classification of RMs, which are considered an “open end
consumer credit plan under which extensions of credit are secured by a consumer’s principal
dwelling” (ibid: 20). Because of this, the federal Truth in Lending Act requires lenders to warn
their customers that “loss of dwelling may occur in the event of default” (ibid: 21). Such a
statement bears little resemblance to the truth, because the nature of RMs is such that ‘default’ is
a concept more relevant for the lender than the borrower, and borrowers lose their property only if
they fail to pay taxes or intentionally harm their homes. Moreover, Case and Schnare (1994: 344)
note that the same Act requires the sending of a brochure to all RM customers that details
traditional home equity lines of credit, and includes such contextually alarmist statements like
“failure to repay the line of credit could mean the loss of your home”.
The tax treatment of RMs also needs to be explicitly (and perhaps favourably) delineated.
Currently, the treatment of annuity-income from a reverse mortgage is ambiguous, and the issue
of property capital-gains tax in the context of a reverse mortgage is not stipulated. More

26
significantly, the Internal Revenue Service is deliberating as to whether RMs are really loans or
sales. The latter decision would be disastrous for the elderly, since income would likely be
considered wholly taxable, and social security benefits would consequently be threatened. These
points highlight the need for a co-ordinated financial and legal framework for the establishment of
a viable RM market in Japan or elsewhere. The US experience can deliver some lessons of what
not to do in Japan or elsewhere.
IV. Advantages and Disadvantages of Reverse Mortgages

Mechanisms that give elderly homeowners access to their home equity have privately
beneficial as well as problematic aspects, both of which bear mentioning. One appealing result of
a RM is that the borrower can diversify his wealth portfolios, instead of keeping a substantial
share of the portfolio in a single, nondiversified, and hence risky, asset. Another beneficial
outcome of a RM loan is that it can boost consumption by the elderly without forcing a house
sale. Avoiding the sale of the home implies that an elderly homeowner can remain relatively
independent for longer, avoiding the substantial monetary and psychic costs associated with
moving. Staying in one’s home also provides the homeowner a degree of insurance against
fluctuations in the cost of rental housing (Sinai and Souleles, 2001). Of course, linking the RM to
an annuity affords the elderly homeowner the peace of mind associated with not running out of
money, since the borrower is guaranteed a continued income flow for life. Finally, RMs can play
a role in inheritance, offering heirs the possibility that some housing value may remain to be
passed along in the form of a bequest, if the elderly owner dies early enough or if housing
appreciates fast enough. Conversely, the older homeowner is less likely to pass on unintended
bequests since more of the home asset can be accessed and annuitized.
A potential negative result of RMs is that some prospective heirs might be disappointed if
their parents consume part or all of their home equity. That is, many adult children hope to
receive their parents’ housing asset in bequest form, and some of these will certainly receive less
under the RM arrangement, than if the parents had not take a loan against the asset. Of course,
such adult children might have subsidized their parents’ medical bills and other consumption
needs if they wanted to help them avoid tapping home equity via RMs. Another problematic
aspect of RMs is the fact that their inherent complexity makes them difficult to explain to elderly
homeowners and their offspring. A related concern is that the nature and size of up-front
origination costs make RMs expensive to hold for a short period. It is only when these costs are
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spread over a long time period will they amortize sufficiently to make the investment appear
appealing. For all of these reasons, the US government requires that counselling and “truth in
lending” disclosures be made to all borrowers. Perhaps similar measures could be recommended
for prospective heirs as well, to reduce potential liability concerns. As we have noted above, tax
issues must also be taken into account, since turning one’s housing equity into a life annuity could
boost the elderly person into a higher income tax bracket and reduce his transfer income, as well.
RMs can also have social spillovers, in addition to the private outcomes just enumerated.
One important social benefit is that enabling the elderly to remain at home instead of moving
into a long-term care facility could ease pressures on safety-net programs serving the elderly
(e.g. including publicly provided long-term care and welfare benefits for the indigent). Hence,
RMs could reduce current and future needs to tax workers and directly subsidize the asset-rich
but cash-poor elderly. Using RMs to retrofit homes to make them more accessible to people
with mobility problems and other disabilities would generate similar social as well as private
benefits. Another spillover from the spread of RMs is that the real estate market might become
more liquid, and older homeowners might gain a better idea of the value of their homes.
Particularly in countries where housing markets are poorly developed, RMs could enhance the
usefulness and timeliness of housing price information and make the housing market more
complete.
Turning to the social cost side, it is possible that state and local government tax revenue
would fall if the elderly opt for RMs instead of selling their homes. Whether on net capital
gains, property tax, and other tax revenue would rise or fall, and the timing thereof, would have
to depend on the specifics, topics that demand future attention. A widespread move to RMs,
particularly of the HECM form, might also end up being costly if the government mispriced
insurance offered to lenders.27
V. Implementation Issues in the Japanese Context

To determine where and why RMs would work well in the future and for whom, we next
explore conditions supportive of, and detrimental to, the process of unlocking home equity for
elderly homeowners. We begin by focusing on general conditions, and then we turn to some
specific conditions that may be particularly relevant to Japan.
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14. Conditions Supportive of Unlocking Home Equity:

As mentioned above, implementing the RM model for the elderly requires the lender to
assemble several key pieces of information regarding the homes and their owners:
 Accurate initial home values, net of remaining mortgage and repairs to bring the

property to code or zoning standards;
 Estimated transaction and closing costs, as well as expected servicing costs;
 Accurate forecasts of expected future home appreciation rates, taking into account

adverse selection and/or moral hazard on the part of the borrowers;
 Accurate forecasts of residents’ future expected mortality and termination patterns;
 Accurate forecasts of future expected riskless rates, mortgage rates, and annuity rates

of return;
 Accurate forecasts of future tax/transfer policy, which influence the net costs and

benefits of the RM options.
Clearly these data demands are substantial, and even after more than a decade of
experience in the US, much remains to be learned to enhance the workings of the RM market
(Szymanoski and DiVenti, 2001; Rodda et al., 2000). On the positive side, US housing markets
operate relatively transparently and it is possible to obtain up-to-date house price series at the
national and regional levels as illustrated above. Housing experts have also produced price
indexes for specific cities over time (http://www.cswv.com/), though time series for a specific
house or set of houses is, of course, more difficult to obtain. Nevertheless, the data tend to exist
and are being collected since home sale information is generally a matter of public record and is
increasingly being listed on the internet. This may help in the development of forecasts for
future home appreciation, though Shiller and Weiss (1994) find a reasonably high level of price
inertia in the US market. In general, lenders would probably demand insurance against the
vagaries of the housing cycle, or diversify accordingly, so as to protect against the risk of
housing market crashes such as those that have been noted in earlier sections.
Less easy to obtain is information on likely transaction, closing, and servicing costs for
RMs, though past experience probably provides a decent guide in the US case. Little analysis has
been done on the question of whether mortality and loan termination patterns are consistent with
the underlying assumptions, and more should be done on this. Ultimately lenders would probably
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prefer protection against some massive change in mortality risk (e.g. a cure for cancer) but to
date this is probably not diversifiable by private insurers.
Least easily predictable of all, probably, are future interest rates (including the riskless
rate, mortgage rate, and rate used to price annuities) and future tax/transfer policies. In financial
terms, the most critical issue is probably whether lenders can appropriately diversify their book
of RM business, either by spreading investment pools geographically, by selling off their RMs in
a secondary mortgage market, or by buying reasonably priced insurance to protect against key
uncertainties. Some have argued that the private market can securitize reverse mortgages,
though the US market has not developed particularly rapidly. This is in part because RMs require
monthly servicing and periodic credit re-evaluations, requiring expensive and ongoing oversight.
Life insurers might thought to be natural entities that would buy these loans, since the life
insurers take in cash up front and pay out later in life, while RM providers have the opposite
cashflow pattern.28 In general however, a RM lender requires up-front liquidity given nature of
product, since the loan or the annuity is paid immediately, but the house sale may be deferred
long into the future.
15. Potential Payoffs of Reverse Mortgages In Japan

To illustrate the value of unlocking home equity in the international context, we use the
model developed above to evaluate loan balance and annuity payments under alternative reverse
mortgage scenarios. Figure 12 illustrates possible payouts for two home equity levels, $100,000
and $300,000, values which bracket illustrative elderly homeowners’ equity values in the US and
Japan, respectively.
Figure 12 here
We focus mainly on the results for age 85 here, though for completeness the tables also
show results for ages 65 and 75 as well. Our computations employ economic assumptions
relevant to each country, regarding the inflation rate and the riskless real rate of return, as well as
real annuity and mortgage rates.29 These represent rather different economic conditions, with
Japan is assumed to experience deflation and negative real home equity growth (RG) as has been
the case for several years; by contrast, the US simulation assumes low but positive price inflation
and real home equity growth. We use country-specific mortality data, namely period population
mortality tables for US females provided by the Office of the Chief Actuary of the Social
Security Administration (reported in Mitchell et al., 1999), and data for Japanese females from
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the JLT18 mortality tables (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 1998). Finally, for this experiment,
we presume that lenders would charge the same real loan rate (RM) on the reverse mortgage in
both countries.
The simulation model generates a range of outputs for reverse mortgage potential
payouts.30 The first panel of Figure 12 indicates that an 85-year old in the US would, under this
formulation, be eligible to borrow a lump sum of approximately $238,000 against her home
equity of $300,000. Longer Japanese life expectancies combined with less favorable projected
rates of home equity growth imply that an 85-year old Japanese woman would anticipate
receiving a lump sum 12% lower, around $210,000. The second panel shows the real annuity
that the 85-year old woman could anticipate. For the US case, the woman would expect an
annual real benefit stream of almost $38,000 per year over her remaining lifetime. By contrast,
under Japanese assumptions, the woman could anticipate a real flow of $24,300 annually, or onethird less than in the US case. On these grounds, it might be reasonable to conclude that the lump
sum approach to reverse mortgages might be more strongly preferred in Japan versus the US, as
compared to the annuity approach, since the lump sum offers a relatively larger bite of the home
equity value. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that an elderly Japanese woman receiving a real
lifetime annuity of over $24,000 would have a replacement rate of almost 60%, assuming
average income for retired households (reported in Clark and Mitchell, 2002).
A different way to visualize the output of this model is to graph the expected patterns by
age, comparing real home appreciation (or depreciation), and the growth rate of the loan under a
reverse mortgage. This is provided in Figure 13, assuming two different scenarios. Panel A
posits an 85-year old Japanese female along with all the “Japanese case” assumptions, while
Panel B uses female Japanese mortality tables but posits more optimistic assumptions consistent
with the “US economic scenario.” Results are given for both a lump sum and an annuity payout
profile for the reverse mortgage.
Figure 13 here
Both cases assume that the homeowner has initial home equity worth $300,000 and
applies for the loan at age 85. Under assumptions relevant to Japan over the last decade,
represented in the top panel, the home’s value sinks in real terms over time. If the reverse
mortgage were taken as a lump sum, the loan would initially be worth about $210,000. If the
borrower reached age 90, the cumulative loan plus interest would grow to roughly $231,000,
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and by age 95, the loan would be worth on the order of $254,000. If, instead, the borrower took
an annuity payment option, her loan value would initially be about $24,000, growing to $141,000
conditional on survival to age 90, and to $254,000 by age 95. Under the Japanese economic
assumptions the loan balance crosses over, or equals the home equity, at around age 95. It is
interesting that the age of crossover is virtually identical for both the lump sum and the annuity
payout approach. Of course, the size of the shortfall is higher in the lump sum case than in the
annuity case, since the payout is more gradual with the annuity. Further the shortfall rises with
the mortgage loan rate and the annuity interest rate, and falls with the rate of appreciation
expected on the home, all else equal.31
The second scenario uses Japanese mortality tables but the more optimistic US economic
forecasts. Not surprisingly, the projected growth in home equity permits a higher initial lump
sum loan, of about $226,000, which grows to $281,000 by age 90, and $350,000 by age 95,
conditional on survival. The starting annuity is also higher, almost $30,000 per year, growing to
$188,000 and $360 five and ten years out. It is interesting that the crossover age in Scenario A
and B are about the same, age 95, despite the different economic assumptions. In other words,
RM lenders in the Japan market would worry about “crossover risk” just as in the US. The larger
size of the loans under the US assumptions, however, mean that the size of the potential shortfall
as modelled here would be greater than under the more conservative Japanese economic
assumptions.
16. Feasibility of Reverse Mortgages in Japan

Inasmuch as the evidence suggests that older Japanese homeowners could substantially
enhance their consumption with reverse mortgages, we next explore what factors might facilitate
the development of these products in the Japanese context. We identify two types of issues that
must be addressed in this discussion, first those having to do with the housing market, and
second, those having to do with the financial market more generally.
One serious problem confronting the Japanese housing market, and an issue that
especially challenges the RM market, is the low volume of trades in established housing. This is
a problem since the development of RMs requires accurate home valuation methodologies and
data. Yet information on housing trades in Japan is sparse, partly because few elderly move
(Ishikawa and Yajima, 2001). Some argue that the lack of information regarding housing values
and housing trades has directly impeded the development of RMs in Japan (ibid). Unlike in the
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US, Japanese realtors appear to provide very little information to the public on housing quality
and housing market values. Indeed, outside of commercial property, there appear to be no real
estate indexes available.32 Such information asymmetry makes it extremely difficult for
borrowers as well as lenders to develop accurate forecasts of future returns(and volatility) for
housing values. Lack of standard property pricing data also deters the development of a
secondary market for reverse mortgages, which above we have argued could make much more
liquid the market for housing equity.
A related concern is that a well-functioning housing market requires high-quality credit
information on potential borrowers, which also may be less widespread in Japan as compared to
more financially-integrated economies. For example, US credit bureaus readily provide very
low-cost credit ratings to actual and potential customers, whereas in Japan this is not as common.
Perhaps the discrepancy may explain why such a high fraction of a home’s purchase price is
required in Japan as a down payment, typically 30-50% of the purchase price of the property,
versus 10% or less in the US. Seko (1994) argues that high down-payment rates result from the
Japan Housing Lending Corporation’s approach as the main mortgage lender in the country,
financed mainly from the postal savings system and mostly dedicated to new homes (fewer than
10% of the loan volume goes to existing homes). Furthermore, home loans from this source total
only 30-40% of the house and lot value, another obstacle to building equity in the first place.
Research by Flavin and Yamashita (2002) in the US context demonstrates that high down
payments and closing costs constrain the housing market; an international survey by Chiuri and
Jappelli (2000) also finds that higher down payments are associated with lower owner-occupancy
rates for housing. In practice, high-quality credit information is less valuable in the case of
reverse mortgages, since the nonrecourse nature of the home loan means that homeowner credit
histories are not as crucial as in the case of regular, forward mortgage. Nevertheless credit
histories are being used as an indicator of timeliness in paying hazard insurance bills and a wide
variety of other consumer behavior, so an underdeveloped credit market could pose a problem
for the growth of the RM market as well.
Even if the supply of reverse mortgages were to be developed in Japan, there remains a
question as to whether Japanese elders would demand them. That is, how many would borrow
against their housing equity to fund old-age consumption? Some research would imply that there
might be little demand, since among households age 65+, almost two-thirds indicate that they
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intend to leave a bequest, mainly via their house and land and averaging ￥66 M (Tachibanaki,
1994). On the other hand, one could argue that these expectations will be changing as life
expectancies rise and incomes of the elderly are pared down to bring the old-age pension system
closer to solvency. Nevertheless tax regulations seem to promote property transfer by bequest
rather than sale; thus Noguchi and Poterba (1994) argue that property tax rules plus inheritance
tax and the Land Lease Law greatly choke the supply of land and houses in Japan, and may drive
the traditional Japanese co-residence tradition where adult children move in with their parents
and provide an effective consumption annuity in exchange for the promise of the bequest of the
property at the parents’ death.
Offsetting these negative concerns are two positive sets of evidence that could forecast
predict the potential for future growth in Japanese reverse mortgage markets. First, Goetzmann
and Spiegel (2000) have recently shown that housing is dominated as an investment asset in most
nations, since other assets provide higher returns for lower risk. As a consequence, they
recommend that governments everywhere must become far more cautious in encouraging
housing investment among the “financially vulnerable,” which would presumably include the
house-rich, cash-poor elderly. Second, some encouraging evidence is provided by Kase (1994),
who explored an actual reverse mortgage program implemented in Mushashino City, a suburb of
Tokyo, in 1981. This publicly-supported effort provided support services to the elderly in
exchange for payment of a monthly bill, or a reimbursement amount taken from the
homeowner’s equity, where repayment was deferred until the sale of the person’s property. The
funds plus a 5% annual fixed interest rate could not exceed 80% of the value of the land (the
government allocated no value to the building). Though this is clearly an early effort (only 42
people signed up for the reverse mortgage program), it illustrates that there may be some
substantial demand on the part of the elderly, and some willingness on the part of governments to
provide such products.
The growth and development of reverse mortgage markets in Japan also awaits better
ways to forecast expected future home appreciation rates, taking into account adverse selection
and/or moral hazard on the part of the borrowers; accurate forecasts of residents’ future expected
mortality and termination patterns; accurate forecasts of future expected riskless rates, mortgage
rates, and annuity rates of return; and accurate forecasts of future tax/transfer policy, which
influence the net costs and benefits of the RM options. This information set is clearly substantial
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though some progress can be made quickly, perhaps in the area of better mortality tables for
annuitants as contrasted to population tables (McCarthy and Mitchell, forthcoming).
In the end, jump-starting the RM market in Japan would probably require a central
government effort along several lines. Several US institutions are supportive of reverse
mortgages including the Federal Housing Administration which has provided federally-backed
reinsurance to support lenders that sell reverse mortgage products to the elderly. In addition,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have also supported these markets, with Fannie Mae purchasing
virtually all the reverse mortgages on offer in the US. Establishing similar institutions in Japan
might afford certain advantages, since in the US, these governmentally-backed groups are widely
credited with bringing securitization to the housing market (Szymanoski, 1999). Yet it is unclear
whether establishing new institutions such as these in Japan would be politically and
economically feasible at present. The Japanese government already faces serious budget
constraints, and taking on potentially massive new reinsurance liabilities would be very risky.
Even more politically difficult might be the fact reverse mortgage borrowers would have
to have property appraisals conducted and the results provided to possible lenders. In that
process, many elderly who had up to then experienced only “latent” capital losses would become
aware just how much their properties had lost in value as a result of the decade-long recession.
In turn, banks and other mortgage holders would have to recognize that the book value of many
of assets had declined precipitously, making their financial condition appear all the more
precarious. In other words, making the RM market work in Japan would probably be supportive
of other needed financial sector reforms, but these might not necessarily be politically palatable.
Experts see several valuable roles for government in this area. One is in eliminating
regulatory and tax barriers limiting the products’ development. For example, tax reform and
clarification/unification of real estate laws would greatly enhance opportunities for profitability.
Another factor that would greatly the operation of the market in Japan would be the building of a
market database on housing quality, trades, and prices (Rasmussen et al 1996; Nishimura and
Shimizu 2003). In the US case, this was necessary for Lehman Brothers to securitize the entire
RM book of business for the Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corporation in 1999 (Rodda et
al., 2000). Another role for government was demonstrated in the US case, where Fannie Mae
offers the possibility that at least one investor provides liquidity for banks to take on the reverse
mortgages. DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996) note that to launch a secondary market for regular
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(forward) mortgages in the US, the mortgages had to be “commoditized”, or standardized with
similar terms. For instance the mortgage had to be 30-year, fixed rate, and self amortizing, and
borrowers had to meet similar qualification standards (i.e. the monthly mortgage payment plus
taxes and insurance initially had to be less than 28% of income to qualify for the loan). A
parallel structure in Japan might be required to make RMs become feasible for the private
lending market.
VI. Conclusions and Potential Policy Responses

Evidence suggests that many older Japanese have quite high levels of home equity,
notwithstanding the recent decline in real estate prices in that nation. At the same time, Japanese
life expectancy rates are also among the highest in the world. These long life spans, when paired
with very low fertility, mean that the Japanese retirement systems face almost certain future
insolvency. This report suggests that methods of unlocking home equity in Japan could be
developed to boost consumption among the elderly, reduce public pension liability, and mitigate
the demand for long term care facilities. Creative ways to finance old-age consumption in Japan,
by tapping home equity, might substantially improve retirement security in this rapidly aging
country.
Previous literature on asset patterns by age has often overlooked housing wealth as a
determinant of retiree wellbeing, particularly in the Japanese context. Here we have collected
and analysed a range of international data on housing wealth patterns by age. Evidence from the
Japanese National Family Income and Expenditure Survey (NFIES), and other sources, indicates
some similarities regarding levels and patterns of home equity by age across countries. There are
also many financing mechanisms that could help unlock housing wealth for retirement
consumption, and here we focus on the potential implications of Reverse Mortgages (RMs) in a
comparative context. Using Japanese and US mortality tables, as well as other economic
assumptions, we compute the lump sum values, as well as the real annuity payments, that could
be financed under alternative RM schemes in the US and Japan.
17. Conclusions

Our analysis suggests several conclusions. First, we show that Japan offers an
environment conducive to the development, implementation, and encouragement of reverse
mortgages. Japanese elderly today command relatively high levels of home equity by
international standards. Consequently, this demographic group could expect substantial value
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from unlocking home equity with a reverse mortgage. In addition, the decline in Japanese
fertility over the last 50 years implies that older households will have fewer children, implying
that the elderly may curtail their supply of bequests to the next (smaller) generation. This should
make it easier for the elderly to unlock home equity for consumption purposes during their
lifetimes.
A second conclusion is that the use of reverse mortgages could alleviate some of the
financial strain that population aging imposes on the Japanese economy and budget. Old-age
pensions already face insolvency, and the new Japanese long-term care program portends
additional budgetary pressures. Retirement incomes are typically below labor earnings in Japan,
and stringencies imposed by financing problems are further depressing the benefit replacement
rate that can be financed by the PAYGO social security system. This too is likely to have a
positive impact on the demand for RMs.
Despite long Japanese life expectancy and less than robust economic conditions, we also
conclude that Japanese elderly could experience a large income increase from a reverse annuity
if it were paid out in a lump sum, or in the form of an annual income stream until death.
Replacement rates might be boosted substantially with the development of a RM market that
permitted older Japanese to finance consumption using their home equity.
18. Potential Policy Responses

Policymakers wanting to establish a market for reverse mortgages in Japan would have to
mitigate several factors that appear to impede the development of such products. For one, tax and
regulatory obstacles would need to be removed to support these financial arrangements.
Exempting reverse mortgages from capital gains and transactions taxes would certainly make
these financial products more appealing. Another area requiring attention has to do with the tax
treatment of income from reverse mortgages: for instance, making annuity income flows from
RMs tax exempt would likely enhance their appeal to the elderly. Tax policy is also crucial to
lenders, who would be more likely to find the market viable if regulations permitted them to
deduct interest payments accumulating on RMs but not payable until the sale of the house.
It would also be critical for Japan to develop a clear and transparent legal framework for
reverse mortgage contracts, in order to help the elderly unlock their home equity. The borrower
and the lender must understand clearly the obligations each takes on when making the deal, and
each must have legal recourse in the event of fraud or misbehavior. For instance, US lenders are
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forced to content with real estate and insurance laws that differ across the 50 US states, making it
impossible to have a standard, nationally enforceable, RM contract. This complexity undermines
the potential for scale economies and standardization on the part of the lenders, and it also makes
it difficult to educate potential borrowers about the nature of the products. Undue complexity
also gives rise to potential conflicts of interest between lenders and borrowers, once an
individual loan has reached the crossover point.
Japanese housing markets would also need to be modernized in several ways if RMs are
to function effectively in this nation. Enhanced information flows would be needed regarding
sale prices and characteristics of both new and existing residential property.33 This would permit
the securitization of housing loans and lines of credit, both of which we have argued make home
equity accessible to older persons. Establishing reinsurance mechanisms would also encourage
lenders to offer these products while offering them some protection against crossover risk. In the
US case, the federal government has played a key role in the development of standardized price
and housing quality data via the two housing loan authorities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. To
develop the basic information required for securitization in Japan’s housing market, it would
likely be necessary to have the federal government jump-start the process with a similar set of
institutions. Transactions costs and servicing costs would also have to be kept down by
competition and enhanced market fluidity, ideally to below rates currently charged in the US
(e.g. 6% of the initial loan value in the case of a lump sum loan.)
Policies supportive of RM markets would also include changes in other financial sectors
complementary to the RM market. For example, strengthening the life insurance sector would
make more appealing the sale of lifelong annuity streams, a key piece of the annuity-oriented
version of the RM structure. Having a strong long-term bond market is also critical to the
development of RM loans, since lenders would need to borrow long-term in order to pay out the
lump sums and annual income flows needed by the elderly who wish to unlock their home
equity. The recent move by the US federal government to offer inflation-protected bonds is a key
element in a long-term commitment to help preserve consumption streams of the elderly.
Implementing a program of RMs would be a fruitful means of helping the elderly finance
their consumption in Japan, a particularly valuable development against the backdrop of
financial stringencies facing the government. Of course additional modelling would be helpful,
in order to develop a clearer idea of potential costs and benefits in the Japanese context. For
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example, our model along with others in the RM literature assumes a deterministic interest rate
process; additional research is required incorporating sources of volatility and correlation across
assets and liabilities. Our model also assumes no transaction costs, or conversely, that
homeowners have substantial net equity after accounting for these costs; additional research
would be useful on the likely level of such costs in Japan. Additional analysis would also be
required to determine the value of lender insurance required in the Japanese context. Demand
for such insurance will be greater when residential housing values are declining, and interest
rates are low, which is apparently true for Japan in the near term. Further research would also be
useful in exploring alternative ways to structure RM payments so as to make the products more
appealing to borrowers, and how these might vary with key parameters of interest.
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Figure 1

Dwelling Values by Age and Income: Japan, (2000's Yen)
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Figure 2
Median Home Equity by Age: US (1995)
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Figure 3

Average Home Values, and Equity Therein: Australia, the
US, and Japan (owner-occupiers only), 2000
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Survey, Wave 5; Economagic (online resource); World Bank (2002), World Development Indicators, Table 5.6
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Figure 4
Owner Occupier Rates by Age: Japan, US, Australia
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Figure 5
Cross-City Comparison of Real House Prices
(1988=100)
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Figure 6

Cross-Country Comparison of Real Housing Prices
(1995=100)
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Figure 7

Housing Status Change at Death of Spouse
Women
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Figure 8
Change in Ownership Status Among the Elderly
Women
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Figure 9

Moving Rates of Owner Households Age 65 and Over
Japan (1998)

US (1997)
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Figure 10

Reverse Mortgage Lump Sum or Monthly Payment (for tenure in home), by
Age and Home Value: US HECM and Homekeeper Loans
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Figure 11
Reverse Mo rtg ag es: Unc ertainty o f Interest Rate
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Figure 12
Illustrative Reverse Mortgage Payout Comparisons for US and Japan

Value of Home Equity
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Note: Authors’ computations assume initial home equity set (respectively) of $100,000 and $300,000 for
loan taken out by female at given age, surviving according to (respectively) Japanese or US population tables.

A. US economic assumptions:
Risk-free real rate (r) = 2.0%;
Real home equity growth rate (r+g) = 1.0%;
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Real mortgage rate (r+m) = 4.5%;
Real AIR for annuity (r+a) = 3.0%

B. Japan economic assumptions:
Risk-free real rate (r) = -0.6%;
Real home equity growth rate (r+g) = -2.4%;
Real mortgage rate (r+m) = 1.9%;
Real AIR for annuity (r+a) = 0.4%
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Figure 13
Lifetime Profile of Assets vs Liabilities in a Reverse Mortgage Setting: Two Alternative
Scenarios, Assuming Borrower with $300,000 in home equity

Scenario A: 85-year old Japanese Female at Loan Date and Japanese Economic
Assumptions

Assets vs Liabilities: Japanese Female, Age 85 at Loan Date
(Japanese Economic Assumptions)
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Notes: The following economic assumptions were employed:
Inflation rate = -0.6% annually (‘01 estimate; www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2092.html)
r = -1.2 - (-0.6) = -0.6% (last 12 mos as of Oct ‘02: www.boj.or.jp/en/siryo/sk/ske4.pdf)
r + a = -0.6 + 1 = 0.4%
r + g = -3-(-0.6) = -2.4% (www.boj.or.jp/en/siryo/sk/ske4.pdf)
r + m = 2.5 + (-0.6) =1.9%
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Scenario B: 85-year old Japanese Female at Loan Date and US Economic
Assumptions
Assets vs Liabilities: Japanese Female, Age 85 at Loan Date
(US Economic Assumptions)
Accumulated Value ($)
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1,000,000
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Accumulated Life Annty PMTs
(RR)
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House Equity Value (RG)

250,000
0
85

95

105

115

Age of Borrower

Notes: The following economic assumptions were employed:
Inflation rate = 1.5% (last 12 most as of Dec ‘02; www.econedlink.org/lessons/index.cfm?lesson=EM222)
r = 3.5 - 1.5 = 2% (1-yr Treasury rate Dec ‘02; www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/a/tcm1y.txt)
r + a = 2 + 1 = 3%
r + g = 1%
r + m = 2 + 2.5 = 4.5%
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Endnotes

1

This refers to the population aged 65+ as a proportion of the working-age population.

2

RMs can also be for a fixed term, but these are less common since they can necessitate the sale

of the residence while the borrower is still alive: a considerable upheaval.
3

These statistics are taken from the National Reverse Mortgage Lenders Association website,

available at www.reversemortgage.org/niche.htm
4

See National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Selected Demographic

Indicators for Japan, Table 9, available at www.ipss.go.jp/English/S_D_I/Indip.html#t_9
5

See the ABS Year Book Australia 2002, available at

www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/8A473DD330B6176DCA256B350010B3F8
6

See The Economist, 28th May, 2002, available at

www.wsu.edu/~hallagan/Econ198/Weeks/Week11/housing/housing.html
7

When lending institutions hold assets that are perceived as relatively risky, such as mortgages,

regulatory agencies will insist that the institutions increase their proportion of capital to facilitate
greater confidence in repayment. Thus lenders like to sell some proportion of their mortgages to
avoid the associated capital charges. Indeed, the new Basle Capital Adequacy provisions of 1999
specifically emphasise the importance of risk weighting in relation to assets. The relative
riskiness of assets in institutions’ portfolios is becoming a more important determinant of their
capital requirements. This issue is therefore very relevant for RMs.
8

It is interesting to note that the whole issue of RMs has become relevant for the formerly

communist countries of Russia and Eastern Europe. There, the sudden surge of private housing
equity following economic liberalisation has created a potential market for RMs, and the often-
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precarious state of public finances in these countries further reinforces their potential efficacy.
See Syzmanoski and DiVenti (2001) for a detailed exposition of this topic.
9

See ABS Australian Social Trends 1998, available at

www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs@.nsf/94713ad445ff1425ca25682000192af2/c1b75964822d74f9ca
2569ad000402be!OpenDocument
10

See the US Census Bureau, Asset Ownership of Households, available at

www.census.gov/hhes/www/wealth/1995/wealth95.html
11

See footnote 8, current dollars

12

See footnote 11.

13

This issue has arisen a number of times in the literature. Hayashi et al (1988) try to correct for

this possible bias, while Takayama and Kitamura (1994) contend that it is not material.
14

For a discussion of this phenomenon in relation to consumption smoothing see Hurst and

Stafford (2001).
15

For an Asian example, McCarthy, Mitchell and Piggott (2002) discuss this problem in

Singapore.
16

For further discussion of reverse mortgages see AARP (2001), NRMLA (nd), and Rasmussen

et al. (1997).
17

This discussion draws on AARP (2001) and Mayer and Simons (1994).

18

Alternatively the lender may provide a lower rate that adjusts monthly, and in this event the

lifetime ceiling is 10 percentage points.
19

Because people choose when to draw down their line-of-credit, this option cannot be modelled

simply; but it embodies elements of both a lump sum (since people can presumably drawn down
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large amounts of credit), and an annuity (since people can obtain credit on more than one distinct
occasion.)
20

Such problems might alter the terms of the RM policy, as suggested for example by Shiller and

Weiss (1998) who propose that the loan be keyed not to the homeowner’s own property
appreciation but to a national housing index.
21

In the US case, a white female population period mortality table (the Decennial 1979-1981 life

table) is used to price HECMs (Quercia 1997). Using female instead of sex-specific cohort tables
tends to make the loan amounts lower than they would be using male tables, whereas using
population period tables rather than annuitant cohort tables would make the loan amounts higher
than the alternative. It is not known whether RM borrowers have experienced actual mortality
substantially different from projections. While Syzmanoski recognizes that HECM mortality
might differ from population rates, he was unable to distinguish empirically between houses sold
due to death versus termination for other reasons (Syzmanoski and DiVenti, 2001). Lenders
cannot take medical conditions into account when pricing RMs (Syzmanoski, 1999), though
Mayer and Simons (1994) suggest this might be a group likely to prefer RMs. In the latter case,
underwriting could actually make the product more attractive for precisely those people who
need it the most.
22

Fannie Mae provides homeowners with RM loans having higher limits than can be provided

under the HECM program, namely $322,700 for 2003 (see
http://www.reversemortgage.org/homekeep.htm).
23

This section draws on Syzmanoski (2001).
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24

Individual states have solvency pools backing insurance products including annuities, but

more research is required on exactly how secure these RAM payments would be in the event of a
non-reinsured lender bankruptcy.
25

Inasmuch as elderly homeowners are currently exempted from capital gains taxes in the US

this would not be a widespread problem under current tax law.
26

Texas, for example, had laws prohibiting lenders from making mortgages for any reason

except home renovation or purchase; and Tennessee has rescinded a law that prescribed a 20year maximum for open-ended credit facilities.
27

The US General Accounting Office and Congressional Budget Offices suggest that Fannie

Mae and Freddie Mac benefit from government subsidies, though it is beyond the scope of the
present paper to investigate the size of these subsidies; this is a topic for future research.
28

On the other hand, prior research has shown that life insurance and annuities are not

necessarily a good hedge for each other; see McCarthy and Mitchell (forthcoming).
29

For Japanese historical data, the following assumptions were employed:

Inflation rate = -0.6% annually (‘01 estimate;
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2092.html)
r = -1.2 - (-0.6) = -0.6% (last 12 mos as of Oct ‘02: www.boj.or.jp/en/siryo/sk/ske4.pdf)
r + a = -0.6 + 1 = 0.4%
r + g = -3-(-0.6) = -2.4% (www.boj.or.jp/en/siryo/sk/ske4.pdf)
r + m = 2.5 + (-0.6) =1.9% (same real rate assumed for US and Japan)
For the case consistent with US assumptions, we used the following:
Inflation rate = 1.5% (last 12 most as of Dec ‘02;
www.econedlink.org/lessons/index.cfm?lesson=EM222)
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r = 3.5 - 1.5 = 2% (1-yr Treasury rate Dec ‘02;
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/a/tcm1y.txt)
r + a = 2+ 1 = 3%
r + g = 1% (as per Tom Davidoff)
r + m = 2 + 2.5 = 4.5% (same real rate assumed for US and Japan).
30

To simplify computations, they assume no closing or servicing costs. Consequently payouts

are an upper bound as compared to results with such costs incorporated.
31

It should be noted that these computations are deterministic so they do not allow for volatility

in any of the key rates, nor do we include correlations between the various rates. Studies of the
HECM product do make simplifying assumptions about means, standard deviations, and
correlations of key variables; see Szymanoski (1994).
32

For more discussion on this point see Nishimura and Shimizu (2003).

33

Nishimura and Shimuzu (2003) discuss information shortfalls in the Japanese property market.

